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DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA (S.DAVIS/W.ALBERQUE) AND EUR/CE
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TAGS: [AORC](#) [CDG](#) [ENRG](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UNGA](#)
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SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW
CONFERENCE 2010: SWISS VIEWS AND POLICY-MAKING

REF: A. STATE 83600
[1](#)B. BERN 342
[1](#)C. BERN 108

Classified By: Acting POLE Counselor Chris Buck; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: The Swiss government strongly supports entry into force of the CTBT, negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, and efforts to reinforce the NPT, particularly with regard to disarmament and arms control issues. The Swiss welcome U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations, and are convinced that near-term progress on U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations will be essential to setting the stage for a successful NPT Review Conference in May 2010. The Swiss government tends to emphasize disarmament over nonproliferation in the framework of the NPT. Switzerland plans once again to co-sponsor a resolution in the UN First Committee on de-alerting nuclear weapons. It also is developing an initiative for a "ban on use" of nuclear weapons, but key contacts have been vague on the initiative's form, content, and timing, other than to indicate that, as conceived, it would be further reaching than negative security assurances and not likely ready for discussion until after this year's UN First Committee.

[1](#)2. (C) Summary continued: As a general rule, Switzerland sees its comparative advantage in multilateral fora in pursuing variable diplomatic constellations of convenience to meet its national objectives. Switzerland is a member of the IAEA BOG for 2007-2010. Switzerland is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). FDFA contacts report that the Swiss government has proposed long-time Swiss PermRep to the CD, Ambassador Juerg Streuli, to chair negotiations on a FMCT. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has the overall Swiss government lead on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation policy issues. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) also plays an important role in the policy process, particularly with regard to export controls and sanctions implementation. The Swiss government will assess nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policies or positions based on whether the policies/positions are non-discriminatory, verifiable, and legally-binding. Swiss academia and NGOs generally are a remote presence on NPT-related issues, as is the Swiss Parliament. However, the Swiss chapter of the International

Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) has the task of organizing the next (19th) IPPNW World Congress, which will be held in Basel in August 2010. End Summary.

NPT-related Questions

13. (C) Per reftels A and C, post offers the following feedback on issues related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), arms control, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT):

Q: What is the Swiss government's general attitude towards CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What factors influence its attitudes and positions?

A: The Swiss government strongly supports entry into force of the CTBT, negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, and efforts to reinforce the NPT, particularly with regard to disarmament and arms control issues. The Swiss welcome U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations, and are convinced that near-term progress on U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations will be essential to setting the stage for a successful NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

The Swiss government tends to emphasize disarmament over nonproliferation in the framework of the NPT, and Swiss officials and pundits are convinced that the success of the next NPT RevCon will depend more on further progress on nuclear disarmament than on nonproliferation. This emphasis to some degree reflects Switzerland's unusual circumstance as

a neutral nation standing outside of NATO and the EU, and thus disconnected from the security commitments ultimately underwritten (explicitly or implicitly) by Western nuclear weapon states. Switzerland's views on the NPT also are driven by the same general forces shaping public attitudes in other European countries, with many Swiss finding it difficult to understand why the nuclear weapon states continue to maintain and to modernize large nuclear arsenals.

When evaluating arms control and disarmament agreements, the Swiss government's mantra is "non-discriminatory, verifiable, and legally binding."

Q: What positions on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts is the Swiss government likely to take in upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT RevCon in 2010?

A: Switzerland is a CTBT Annex 2 country that ratified the Treaty in 1999. The Swiss government strongly supports entry into force of the CTBT.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Switzerland strongly supports immediate commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT.

For the Swiss, a successful substantive outcome of the 2010 NPT RevCon would be a consensus document that contains new obligations for nuclear weapon states, along the lines of the 1995 NPT RevCon objectives and the 2000 NPT RevCon "13 Steps" -- especially with regard to CTBT ratification and commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT.

The Swiss government is developing an initiative for a "ban on use" of nuclear weapons, but key contacts have been vague on its form and content, other than to indicate that, as conceived, it would be further reaching than negative security assurances. Those same Swiss contacts report that they do not think that the "ban on use" idea will be ripe enough for the UN First Committee. While explaining that the idea is still a work-in-progress, they indicate that they view it as a possible initiative for the NPT RevCon. It is unclear whether the Swiss have already shared the idea in detail with other countries, with a view to garnering support, but Swiss contacts indicate they expect to do so.

In assessing progress in U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations, Switzerland can be expected to emphasize transparency, verifiability, and that any agreement should be legally binding.

As in recent past years, the Swiss government, in cooperation with a number of other governments, plans once again this year to table a UN First Committee resolution on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (i.e., de-alerting). Swiss experts are convinced that the barriers to de-alerting are political, not technical/operational, and argue that acceptance of a de-alerting resolution by nuclear weapon states in the First Committee would help to set a positive atmosphere for the subsequent NPT RevCon.

Q: With which countries does Switzerland work most closely on these issues?

A: In 2008, Switzerland co-sponsored its UN First Committee de-alerting resolution with Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Sweden. As a general rule, Switzerland -- as a neutral "Western Group" nation -- sees its comparative advantage in multilateral fora in pursuing variable diplomatic constellations of convenience to meet its national objectives. In promoting initiatives in multilateral fora, the Swiss generally favor working closely with small- to medium-sized states, and consciously steer clear of the company of bad or otherwise controversial actors with regard to anything they co-sponsor or collectively champion. Against this backdrop, some Swiss affinity for working with Nordic states and Ireland is evident.

Q: Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related ministries, and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora?

A: The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has the overall Swiss government lead on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation policy issues. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) also plays an important role in the policy process, particularly the FDEA's State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is responsible for export controls and sanctions implementation. The Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications (DETEC) has a secondary role in NPT-related policy making, and defers to FDFA and SECO on issues that do not have direct relevance for the nuclear industry or environment.

FDFA: Aside from Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey, who only will be familiar with the broad outlines of the issues, the key senior policy-maker for NPT-related issues at the FDFA is State Secretary (Deputy Minister/PolDir) Michael Ambuehl. The most important NPT-related, expert level policy-maker is Andreas Friedrich, Head of the FDFA's Arms Control and Disarmament Section. Friedrich has been working on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues for decades at the FDFA, and is widely respected for his expertise within Swiss government circles. In addition to Friedrich, Ambuehl has appointed Dr. Christian Schoenenberger as Head of the "Swiss NPT Task Force." However, Schoenenberger appears thus far to be focused on working on the "ban on use" initiative that the Swiss government is developing, and indications thus far are that Friedrich remains the main overall POC for the range of NPT-related topics.

FDEA/SECO: Aside from Economic Minister Leuthard, who only will be familiar with the broad outlines of the issues, State Secretary (Deputy Minister) Jean-Daniel Gerber is the key senior policy-maker for NPT-related issues at the FDEA. Below Gerber, our key interlocutor is Erwin Bollinger, Head of the Sanctions and Export Policy Division.

DETEC: Aside from Energy Minister Leuenberger, who only will be familiar with the broad outlines of the issues, Dr. Walter Steinmann, Director of the Federal Office of Energy (FOE), is

our most important DETEC interlocutor. Steinmann serves as Switzerland's Governor on the Board of Governors (BOG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Below Steinmann, Pierre Multone, the FOE's Special Representative for International Nuclear Affairs is the most important DETEC interlocutor for NPT-related issues.

Q: What role does Switzerland play in arms control and nonproliferation organizations? Do the Swiss take a leadership role on any issues?

A: Given Switzerland's unique international profile and the presence of UN agencies in Geneva, the Swiss government often enjoys disproportionate influence in international fora. However, the Swiss government often takes a low-key approach to politically contentious issues in arms control and nonproliferation organizations -- probably at least in part to preserve its real or perceived capacity to mediate disputes.

Switzerland is a member of the IAEA BOG for 2007-2010.

Switzerland is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). FDFA contacts report that the Swiss government has proposed long-time Swiss PermRep to the CD, Ambassador Juerg Streuli, to chair negotiations on a FMCT.

Switzerland has been a member of the UN since 2002, and in recent years has co-sponsored a UN First Committee resolution on de-alerting nuclear weapons.

Q: How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policy-making process work in Switzerland, and what is the

interplay among government officials and agencies? Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on which issues?

A: As noted above, the FDFA has the overall policy lead on NPT-related issues, in close coordination with the FDEA/SECO and, to a lesser extent, DETEC. There are no more than 15-20 experts on NPT-related issues in the entire Swiss government, and interagency coordination appears to function smoothly. The FDFA (Ambuehl/Friedrich) enjoys primacy on all high policy issues. FDEA/SECO (Gerber/Bollinger) has more leverage on sanctions implementation and export regime topics. DETEC (Steinmann/Multone) has the greatest input on topics affecting significant equities of the nuclear industry and environment -- i.e., technical cooperation, such as proposals for multilateral nuclear fuel banks and nuclear waste disposal.

Q: What are the key factors that drive Swiss adoption or rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control or nonproliferation issues?

A: The Swiss government will assess nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policies or positions based on whether the policies/positions are non-discriminatory, verifiable, and legally-binding. The Swiss will tend to favor nuclear disarmament and arms control over nonproliferation, arguing that greater progress on nuclear disarmament will allow like-minded states to gain more traction on nonproliferation initiatives.

Q: How many people in Switzerland's Missions (New York, Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they? Are Swiss Mission personnel and resources augmented during key relevant meetings?

A: Post does not have access to detailed information regarding which staff at the Swiss multilateral Missions have expertise in NPT-related issues, but it is certain that the Swiss Missions to the UN-New York, CD-Geneva, and IAEA-Vienna are relatively thinly staffed in general, and must routinely be augmented by experts from capital during major meetings. Ambassador Streuli, Swiss PermRep to the CD, is reputedly a

subject expert in the field of arms control and disarmament, but post has not had contact with him or the other Swiss Mission PermReps. FDFA contacts report that the FDFA has submitted to the Swiss Parliament a request for a multi-million dollar budget increase for arms control and disarmament programming, in part to allow the FDFA to fund additional staff to support Streuli, if he is selected to chair the FMCT negotiations.

Q: What are the roles and influence of Switzerland's nuclear power industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making?

A: The influence of the Swiss nuclear power industry on NPT-related issues is generally limited, except for in the area of nuclear cooperation and fuel cycle technology controls. Whether in response to urging that Switzerland move from observer to participant in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), or with regard to calls for Swiss support to possible multilateral nuclear fuel initiatives, the Swiss argue that current commercial supply of nuclear fuel is working fine, and claim that Switzerland is leery of becoming part of a nuclear "cartel" that could end up undercutting Swiss options for nuclear cooperation.

Swiss academia and NGOs generally are a remote presence on NPT-related issues, as is the Swiss Parliament. However, the Swiss chapter of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) has the task of organizing the next (19th) IPPNW World Congress, which will be held in Basel in August 2010. Swiss IPPNW representatives already have been in touch with post regarding their request for an appropriate USG speaker at that event.

Q: What are the key alliances with other governments on arms control and nonproliferation issues? For example, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)? To what extent does Switzerland appear to influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line?

A: Aside from Switzerland's de-alerting resolution in the UN First Committee, post is not aware of any key alliances or relationships that the Swiss have with other governments on NPT-related issues. Switzerland's emphasis on nuclear disarmament issues generally parallels some NAM and G-77 recurring themes, and the Swiss often demonstrate sensitivity to NAM and G-77 views. However, Switzerland is not, of course, a member of either organization, and quite frequently laments (at least behind closed doors) unreasonable and unconstructive positions taken by the NAM/G-77. The Swiss ability to influence NAM/G-77 positions appears limited, and perhaps not used to its full potential, presumably due to the Swiss inclination to avoid controversy.

Q: How much flexibility do the Swiss Missions to the UN, CD, and IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives?

A: This is difficult for post to assess, though FDFA discipline and hierarchy is less pronounced than in many European foreign ministries, and Swiss diplomats sometimes appear to take a more interpretive approach to their instructions than diplomats in some other European countries.

We have on some occasions (particularly with regard to the IAEA), had indications that timely interventions here in capital in close coordination with U.S. Mission colleagues have helped to move the Swiss position in positive ways. However, it was not clear whether such occasions represented a reigning in of free-lancing Swiss Mission representatives, or simply a change in the Swiss government's position.

14. (U) Post will continue to report on NPT-related Swiss developments, and appreciates Department's support as we work to leverage Swiss engagement in this area toward positive outcomes.

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